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Abstract
The paper argues that society should vary the sanction applied to a
criminal defendant with the weight of the evidence against him or her.
This is optimal when it is costly for society to apply sanctions, since it can
yield the same degree of deterrence while requiring fewer resources to be
spent on sanctioning. Furthermore, when the unfairness of convicting an
innocent defendant increases with the size of the sanction, this provides a
further rationale for graduating sanctions with the probability of guilt.
Some objections are briefly discussed, mainly that it is inherently un-
fair to apply diﬀerent sanctions on people, who have committed the same
oﬀense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it allows sanctions
to vary in the way suggested.
Introduction
Imagine a criminal trial in which the jury has found the defendant guilty,
but where doubts concerning guilt remain. It may for example be diﬃcult to
exlude the possibility that the defendant acted, or believed that he or she acted,
in self-defense. Should, then, the existence and the extent of the remaining doubt
influence the size of the sanction? In the present system, it is generally maintained
that guilt must be proven ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, and that once this level of
certainty has been attained, the sanction should not depend on the extent of any
remaining uncertainties. The question raised in this article is whether this system
is socially optimal, or whether the sanction should be allowed to vary with the
extent of remaining doubts or, put diﬀerently, with the certainty of guilt.
In attempting to answer this question, the first part of the article establishes
a suﬃcient condition for it to be optimal to vary the sanction with the degree of
certainty. It will be shown to be suﬃcient that the cost to society of imposing a
sanction increases with its size. This condition will generally be fulfilled, at least
for non-monetary sanctions1. To see why this is suﬃcient, note that a sanction
applied to an innocent defendant does not have a deterrent eﬀect on potential
oﬀenders ex-ante, since the sanction is not applied to an oﬀender2. Therefore,
when the defendant’s guilt is more certain, the probability that any given sanction
will be ‘wasted’ on an innocent person is smaller, and a higher sanction therefore
yields more deterrence per sanctioning cost (e.g. per year of imprisonment).
The second part of the article demonstrates that including fairness as a social
concern provides a further rationale for varying sanctions with the probability
of guilt. There are two countervailing forces. On the one hand, sanctioning an
innocent defendant is not only a waste in terms of its eﬀect on deterrence, but
also unfair to the defendant, and more unfair the greater the sanction. This is an
argument for varying sanctions. On the other hand, if considerations of fairness
call for a given level of punishment (as the ‘correct’ or ‘fair’ level), this provides
a rationale for not varying sanctions. Of these two forces, it will be shown that
1A fine can to some extent be viewed as simply a transfer.
2This argument presupposes that potential oﬀenders understand that some of the convicted
are innocent, for if potential oﬀenders think that all convicted are guilty, the deterrent eﬀect
will be the same whether the convicted is innocent or guilty.
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the former wins out3, and that considerations of fairness therefore overall provide
a rationale for varying sanctions with the weight of the evidence.
These points are developed in the model, after which some objections will
be discussed, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply diﬀerent sanctions to
people, who have committed the same oﬀense, and that the legal system will lose
legitimacy if it admits that it bases its verdicts on probabilistic evidence rather
than on certainty and ‘proof’. Implications for legal practice will also be briefly
discussed. The article ends with a short literature review, and a summary.
The Model
The model is in the tradition of Becker [2], and builds more particularly on
Shavell and Polinsky [6]. The Shavell and Polinsky article, however, abstracts
from uncertainty concerning guilt, and hence does not address the issue of unfair
conviction and its unfairness cost. The present model extends their framework in
this dimension.
Assume only one kind of criminal act, that causes harm, h, to society. Potential
criminals are assumed risk neutral, and will commit the crime if the benefit, v, is
greater than the expected sanction. The total population is normalized to one,
and the fraction of the population with benefit v is given by the density function
z(v) > 0, and the cumulative distribution function Z(v). It will be assumed
that whenever the criminal act has been committed, somebody will report it
to the police, who will investigate and press charges if there is suﬃcient evidence
against a prime suspect. The evidence generated through investigations and court
proceedings will be stochastic, and may be more or less incriminating. It will be
assumed that the judge/jurors can rank the evidence in this respect, and that the
ranking can be expressed by a continuous variable x ∈ [0,∞[, where the number
is higher the more conclusive the evidence against the prime suspect.
The ratio of the probability of the prime suspect’s guilt (where guilt will be
represented by g), and his or her innocence (i), can be found from the Bayesian
formula P = A × L, where P is the ex-post ratio of the probability of guilt to
the probability of innocence, A is the same ratio ex-ante, where ex-ante refers to
the information existing before any evidence is presented, and L is the likelihood
ratio:
L =
the probability of observing the evidence given guilt
the probability of observing the evidence given innocence
3When the social welfare derived from applying the fair sanction can be assumed to be
diﬀerentiable in the size of the sanction.
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Let fg(x) express the probability of x forthcoming against the prime suspect, if it
is assumed that the prime suspect did commit the crime, and fi(x) the probability
of x forthcoming against the prime suspect, if it is assumed that someone other
than the prime suspect committed the crime. The probability of guilt given x can
then be written4:
prob(g | x) = fg(x)
fg(x) + fi(x)
since prob(g | x) + prob(i | x) = 1, which follows from the fact that the prime
suspect is either guilty or innocent. Note that since the evidence is ordered in
such a way that a higher x means a higher probability of guilt, the likelihood ratio
fg(x)
fi(x)
is by definition increasing in x (since the likelihood ratio is nearly identical
to the probability of guilt in the present context).
If the sanction is s(x) and the level of utility for which a person will be exactly
deterred is ev, then
ev = ∞Z
0
s(x)fg(x)dx
Z(ev) is then the law-abiding and 1 − Z(ev) the criminal part of the population.
For reasons to which we will return, it is natural to imagine policies, where s(x)
is zero for low values of x, and only increasing thereafter, but the analysis will be
not be restricted to such policies.
We now address whether sanctions should be varied when society only cares
about achieving deterrence at low sanctioning costs. Subsequently, the conse-
quences of adding fairness considerations will be analyzed.
The Case of Costly Sanctions Without Concern for Fairness
It will now be assumed that the cost, c, of sanctioning a defendant, whether
guilty or innocent, depends on the size of the sanction, which again may depend
on the level of certainty concerning guilt, i.e.: c = c(s(x)). Note that when sanc-
tioning is costly, Becker’s result [2] that maximal penalties are optimal (because
the maximal penalty economizes on enforcement eﬀort) does not apply.
4This follows from Bayes’ formula. The derivation can be found in Lando [3]. In that paper,
x is treated as the marginal evidence beyond the level that creates a probability higher than
1/2. The present notation is simpler, x is here the total evidence.
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The cost of sanctioning may include the loss of utility of the convicted as well
as the cost to society of incarcerating an individual, but as mentioned it does not
include the sense of unfairness, which an unfairly convicted individual is likely to
feel (or which others may feel on his or her behalf).
Social welfare is maximized when total social costs SC are minimized with
respect to s(x). SC can be written5:
SC = (1− Z(ev))
⎡
⎣h+
∞Z
0
(fg(x) + fi(x))c(s(x))dx
⎤
⎦
where
ev = ∞Z
0
s(x)fg(x)dx
The following proposition can now be proven:
Proposition: When sanctions are costly and not just a transfer, a constant
sanction is dominated in terms of social welfare by a sanction that increases with
x.
Proof: Take an interval I = [x0;x2], in which a constant sanction, s, is applied.
An increasing sanction, es, that dominates s can be formed as follows: Split the
interval into two: [x0;x1] and [x1;x2], such that
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx. Let the
sanction in the first interval be s−∆s and in the latter interval s+∆s where ∆s is
some small number. This sanction increases stepwise with x. The total expected
sanction when es is applied is the same as when s is applied in the whole interval
since
(s−∆s)
x1Z
x0
fg(x)dx+ (s+∆s)
x2Z
x1
fg(x)dx = s
x2Z
x0
fg(x)dx.
when
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx. Thus, deterrence is unchanged. This means that
the number of crimes is unchanged, and what counts for social welfare is whether
or not the cost of sanctioning will increase or decrease. Given the policy es, the
5It is assumed here that the crime is of the kind where the utility derived by the oﬀender
would be considered to be ‘socially illicit’ by most people, and so should not be included in the
social welfare function. However, whether or not the utility of the oﬀender is included plays no
important role in what follows.
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cost of sanctioning in the interval [x0;x1] will be lowered by the amount
(c(s)− c(s−∆s))
x1Z
x0
(fg(x) + fi(x))dx
since the number of convicted defendants, who did commit the crime, will be
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx, while the number of innocently convicted defendants in the inter-
val will be
x1R
x0
fi(x)dx. The cost of sanctioning in the interval [x1;x2] will, by
the same reasoning, be increased by the amount (c(s + ∆s) − c(s))
x2R
x1
(fg(x) +
fi(x))dx. For a small ∆s, the net increase in sanctioning cost can be approxi-
mated as c0(s)∆s(
x2R
x1
(fg(x)+fi(x))dx−
x1R
x0
(fg(x)+fi(x))dx) = c
0(s)∆s(
x2R
x1
fi(x))dx−
x1R
x0
fi(x))dx), where the latter equation follows from the fact that
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx. This net increase is negative, since c
0(s) > 0 and since
x2R
x1
fi(x))dx −
x1R
x0
fi(x))dx < 0. The latter follows from the assumption that fg/fi is increasing
in x, and from the equation
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx. To see this, note that when
fg/fi is increasing in x, there must be some constant κ1 where fg(x)/fi(x) < κ1
in the interval [x0;x1] and fg(x)/fi(x) > κ1 in the interval [x1;x2] . This means
that
x1R
x0
κ1fi(x)dx >
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx >
x2R
x1
κ1fi(x)dx, hence
x1R
x0
fi(x)dx >
x2R
x1
fi(x)dx. Since the new stepwise increasing sanctioning policy yields the same
level of deterrence and spends fewer resources on sanctioning, society should prefer
it. QED.
The point is simply that sanctions deter more when applied to the guilty than
when applied to the innocent. As a consequence, a higher sanction may be justified
when it is highly certain that the defendant is guilty, but may be unjustified, when
there is less certainty. To illustrate this point, consider a potential oﬀender, who
contemplates the possible outcomes if he or she commits the crime, and assume,
to demonstrate the forces at work, that he or she contemplates two diﬀerent
courtproceedings (each of which may either involve him or herself or an innocently
accused person): in one proceeding the evidence amounts to 99% certainty (e.g.
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because DNA evidence can be used), and in the other, the evidence amounts to
90% certainty of guilt (e.g. because witness testimony is the only evidence). When
the former (latter) proceeding occurs the probability that it involves the oﬀender
is 99% (90%). If the sanction in both proceedings is three years imprisonment6,
and the two proceedings occur with the same probability of 20%, the potential
oﬀender can calculate the expected sanction to be
0.2× 9
10
× 3 + 0.2× 99
100
× 3 = 1.13
from the two kinds of proceedings, if he or she commits the crime. If, instead,
the sanction is five years in one proceeding and one year in the other, the expected
sanction will be
0.2× 9
10
× 1 + 99
100
× 0.2× 5 = 1.17
In this example, the expected sanction is approximately 3 % higher when
sanctions are varied, while sanctioning costs are identical.
This raises two issues. First, the main argument presupposes, as mentioned,
that potential oﬀenders realize that the sanction may be applied to an innocent
person, i.e. it is assumed that the policy pursued by the courts is reflected (to some
extent at least) in the expectations of potential oﬀenders7. Second, it has been
implicitly assumed that convicting the innocent does not have a negative impact
on deterrence. This assumption is discussed at length in Lando [3]; the argument
is that if a person decides not to commit a crime such as murder, assault or theft,
the likelihood of that person being innocently convicted for the specific crime
is non-existent, since if the person does not commit the crime, there will be no
victim and no trial. The potential oﬀender may be innocently convicted of other
crimes, but this risk exists whether he or she commits the crime in question or
not8. Wrong convictions will only lower deterrence when one risks being accused
of a specific violation one has not committed, such as speeding in traﬃc.
The Case Where Fairness Is a Concern
6This assumes that the standard of proof is less than 90%, which seems realistic for some
kinds of oﬀenses. This is not critical to the argument, however.
7If incapacitation is added to the model, no such assumption needs to be made, since then
it will automatically be more productive to sanction the guilty than to sanction the innocent.
8It may be that sanctions do not enter additively into the utililty function of the defendant, in
which case the general possibility of innocent conviction may lower deterence, i.e. the potential
oﬀender may think: if one may have to go to prison anyway, why not commit a crime?
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The policy of graduating sanctions is further warranted when fairness is a
social concern. Fairness considerations may play a role in two senses. In one sense,
fairness implies that the sanction should not be applied to innocent defendants,
and naturally, in this sense, fairness would call for varying sanctions with the
degree of certainty concerning guilt. In another sense, the sanction should be in
proportion to the harm caused by the crime or to the malicious intent, or to some
other aspect of the crime committed. In this sense, fairness would generally call
for a uniform sanction - the correct level of punishment for the given criminal
act. It will now be shown that when both these senses of fairness are taken into
account, the overall eﬀect is for graduated sanctions.
In the first sense, the cost of sanctioning the innocent will be expressed by
the function θ(s) and may include not only c(s) and the convicted but innocent
defendant’s sense of unfairness, but also society’s dislike for sanctioning unfairly,
based on sympathy with the innocent defendant who has been wrongly convicted.
In the second sense, the benefit of sanctioning the guilty can be expressed as a
function Q(s). c(s) may be incorporated in Q(s) in which case the benefit Q(s)
may be negative, if the cost of sanctioning is higher than the fairness benefit. The
fairness benefit may be increasing in s, when s is at a low level, and decreasing in
s, when s is at a high level, as noted by Polinsky and Shavell [6].
The social fairness cost of applying s(x) is (1− Z(ev)) R θ(s(x))fi(x)dxcost while
the benefit is (1− Z(ev)) R Q(s(x))fg(x)dx, where (1− Z(ev)) is the number of
crimes,fi(x) is the probability of observing x given that the prime suspect is
innocent, and fg(x)is the probability of observing x given that the prime suspect is
guilty. The social cost from applying the policy s(x) overall can then be expressed
as:
SC = (1− Z(ev))
⎡
⎣h+
∞Z
0
θ(s(x))fi(x)dx−
∞Z
0
(fg(x)Q(s(x))dx
⎤
⎦
where
ev = ∞Z
0
s(x)fg(x)dx
Proposition: When fairness plays a role both in the sense that the sanction
should fit the crime, and in the sense that society perceives an unfairness cost
of sanctioning the innocent, a constant sanction is dominated in terms of social
welfare by one that increases with x.
The proof follows the exact same ideas as that above, and is hence relegated
to the appendix.
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The idea of this proof can be illustrated in the example given above. If the
sanction for the given oﬀense is three years, and, say, four years is considered the
fair sanction by most people (or four years is the median preference), sanctioning
defendants who are believed to be guilty with 99% certainty to five years impris-
onment, and those whose guilt is only 90% certain to one year, would entail a loss
in terms of going both beyond and below the fair sanction (assuming that the
defendant is guilty), rather than being consistently below the fair sanction. For
small graduations around three years, e.g. imposing three and a half year for the
former group and two and half years for the latter, the extra cost in terms of not
sanctioning the guilty at the correct level is likely to be low, since the eﬀect of
increasing the sanction tends to cancel the eﬀect of decreasing it (at least when
preferences are diﬀerentiable). On the other hand, if the cost of sanctioning an
innocent person is one unit per year of imprisonment, graduating the sanctions in
the way suggested incurs a total expected cost in terms of this kind of unfairness
of 0.01× 5 + 0.1× 1 = .15 rather than 0.01× 3 + 0.1× 3 = .33. In this example,
the unfairness cost is more than halved when sanctions are graduated.
Summing up, there are two main motives for graduating sanctions with the
degree of certainty concerning guilt. The first is that sanctioning the innocent is
a waste in terms of deterrence, while the other is that sanctioning the innocent is
unfair.
Discussion
Three objections, and implications for legal practice, will now briefly be taken
up.
First, it may be viewed as unfair to apply diﬀerent sanctions to people, who
have in fact committed the same oﬀense. Second, it may be argued that the legal
system will lose legitimacy, if it admits that sanctions are based on probabilistic
evidence rather than on certainty (‘proof’), and third, one can argue that criminal
sanctions serve as a social stigma, and for this to work, it must be clear to people
what they can infer from a verdict.
The first objection loses some of its appeal when it is realized that people may
already be sanctioned diﬀerently for the same oﬀense. For example, some are
acquitted altogether while others receive a harsh penalty for identical oﬀenses,
and it is not obvious that this is more fair than a system of graduated sanctions.
Concerning the second objection, legitimacy may perhaps depend on the public
understanding that the convicted are (as good as) certain to be guilty. Legitimacy
is enhanced thereby, because it gives the impression that the system is able to
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discover the truth (and that the system is dedicated to finding the truth and does
not sanction people in a superficial manner). It may perhaps also be argued that
the present system, where defendants are acquitted unless proven guilty beyond a
certain high threshold of certainty, acts an incentive for the prosecutor to actually
discover ‘the truth’. However, the real importance of these concerns for legitimacy
and incentives are important in reality, and the implications of these constraints
if they exist need to be given a thorough investigation. However, note that many
people would agree that the death penalty should only be applied (if at all) when
the certainty of guilt is very high, which indicates that at least people who hold
this opinion realize that not all sanctions - not even long prison sentences- are
based on complete certainty.
The third objection seems to call for some treshold probability of guilt as
a condition for applying a sanction at all, but the objection does not seem to
refute the idea that it may be worth sanctioning a person more who is guilty
with 99% certainty than a person who is guilty with 95% or 90% certainty. This
point is worth elaborating. The analysis has provided reasons for graduating
sanctions, but this does not mean that sanctions should vary continuously with
the evidence in the sense that a very low probability of guilt should lead to a very
low sanction. A threshold of evidence below which a defendant is acquitted is
likely to be optimal, if for no other reason because a trial is costly and will not
be worth its cost, if the sanction is very low.
On the issue of the implications for legal practice of the present analysis, there
are two diﬀerent views.
One is that the present system already graduates sanctions to some extent9.
It does, for example, seem likely that a judge or a jury may in some cases be
more reluctant to impose a very harsh sanction (such as capital punishment) on
a person whose guilt is subject to remaining doubts than on a person whose guilt
can be established with high certainty, e.g. through DNA evidence. Furthermore,
it may well be that this practice is not stated openly for fear that doing so would
undermine legitimacy.
The other view is that sanctions are as a rule not aﬀected by the degree
of uncertainty in current practice, and that such a policy would have profound
eﬀects on the system. For example, the procedure of first establishing guilt and
then determining the sanction may be due for revision, if the size of the sanction
becomes connected to the weight of the evidence. This issue is also left for future
9One judge vehemently denied this in private conversation while another thought that sanc-
tions sometimes depend on the degree of certainty.
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research.
The Literature
The general idea that sanctions should depend on certainty of guilt has not (to
my knowledge) been addressed directly in the literature. The following literature
is related:
Shavell [8] shows that liability in tort cases should, for optimal internalization
of harm, be proportional to the probability of causation. Shavell’s model can be
exemplified by a polluting factory which can be attributed in a probabilistic sense
to forty out of one hundred deaths from lung cancer in a given neighborhood
but not to any single individual’s death. Shavell’s result that the factory should
(in the absence of certain administrative concerns) be held liable for 40% of the
compensation for each individual’s death, hinges on the observation that this
rule provides a correct internalization of the harm incurred by the pollution. In
contrast, in the model of this paper, harm was certain to occur, and the reason for
graduating sanctions was either to save on sanctioning costs or on unfairness costs,
not to equate the expected sanction with the expected harm. The two approaches
describe two diﬀerent situations: one where the eﬀect of an action can be measured
only incaccurately and the other where the identity of the wrongdoer cannot be
determined with certainty. Still, the results are related and complementary.
Andreoni [1] explains why higher sanctions may lower deterrence: the jury
may want to acquit when the sanction is harsh, for fear of sanctioning an innocent
person harshly. Andreoni assumes that the sanction is given and cannot be varied
with the amount of evidence, but it is clear that varying the sanction would be
optimal in this setting.
Schauer and Zeckhauser [7] argue that standards of proof, as applied in diverse
domains of decision-making throughout society, should depend on the sanction
that follows from an adverse decision. If the sanction is ten years in prison, the
standard of proof should be higher than if the sanction is being fired from a
job. Although related, this point is diﬀerent from the points made in the present
article: Schauer and Zeckhauser argue that the standard of proof should vary with
the sanction; this paper argues the converse, that the sanction should generally
depend on the degree of certainty concerning guilt.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that, under weak conditions, it is optimal to vary sanc-
tions with the degree of certainty concerning guilt. While it is likely to be optimal,
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for reasons that were mentioned but not fully analyzed, not to sanction at all when
the probability of guilt is below a certain threshold, the point is that beyond this
threshold, it will increase both deterrence and fairness to graduate sanctions. Ar-
guably, sanctions are already graduated to some degree in reality, when judges
and jurors are apprehensive about sanctioning an innocent person harshly. How-
ever, the conventional view is that they should not do so, and it is likely that they
feel constrained in doing so, whereas the present analysis suggests that it should
be the general policy.
Appendix
Proof:
As in the proof of the first proposition, take some interval I = [x0;x2], in
which for all x in the interval a constant sanction, s, is applied. An increasing
sanction, es, that dominates s can be formed as follows: Split the interval into
two: [x0;x1] and [x1;x2], such that
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx. Let the sanction in
the first interval be s−∆s and in the latter interval s+∆s, where∆s is some small
number. This sanction increases with x, stepwise. The total expected sanction
when es is applied is the same as when s is applied in the whole interval, since
(s−∆s)
x1Z
x0
fg(x)dx+ (s+∆s)
x2Z
x1
fg(x)dx = s
x2Z
x0
fg(x)dx.
using that
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx. Thus, deterrence is unchanged. This means
that only the fairness costs θ(s) and Q(s) are changed. Given the policy es, the
benefit from sanctioning in the interval [x0;x2] equals Q(s − ∆s)
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx +
Q(s + ∆s)
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx, while the cost from wrong convictions equals θ(s − ∆s)
x1R
x0
fi(x)dx + θ(s + ∆s)
x2R
x1
fi(x)dx. The change in social fairness benefit per ∆s:
∂sc
∂∆sconverges to zero when ∆s converges to zero, if Q(s) is diﬀerentiable, as in
the first proof.
The unfairness cost of the stepwise policy is
x1R
x0
fi(x)(θ(s−∆s)dx+
x2R
x1
fi(x)(θ(s+
∆s)dx while under the constant sanction, it was
x1R
x0
fi(x)(θ(s)dx in the first interval
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and
x2R
x1
fi(x)(θ(s)dx in the second interval, when the constant sanction s was ap-
plied. The diﬀerence is hence
x1R
x0
fi(x)(θ(s−∆s)dx−
x1R
x0
fi(x)(θ(s)dx+
x2R
x1
fi(x)(θ(s+
∆s)dx−
x2R
x1
fi(x)(θ(s)dx, which equals (θ(s−∆s)− θ(s))
x1R
x0
fi(x)dx+(θ(s+∆s)−
θ(s))
x2R
x1
fi(x)dx. When∆s is small this converges to−θ0(s)∆s
x1R
x0
fi(x)dx+θ0(s)∆s
x2R
x1
fi(x)dx
which is negative when θ0(s) > 0, since
x1R
x0
fi(x)dx >
x2R
x1
fi(x)dx. The latter inequal-
ity follows from the equality
x1R
x0
fg(x)dx =
x2R
x1
fg(x)dx, and from the fact that fg/fi
is increasing in x, in the same way as in the proof of the first proposition. QED.
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